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of a set of stimuli in novel relationships. Suppose, for example, in
one task instance (T1) square predicts circle, circle predicts tri-
angle, and triangle predicts square; in the next task instance
(T2) cross predicts star, star predicts bar, and bar predicts
cross; and so on. The transverse patterning structure and the
fact cross predicts star (information trial) are sufficient to cor-
rectly predict the responses to star and bar in the other two
trials. Even on more complex structures involving more objects
and more information trials, adults reach the point of correctly
predicting the responses on the remaining trials (Halford et al.
1998).
The target authors’ model fails to account for this sort of
abstract analogy because the system can only utilize relations
between objects that have already been learned as transform-
ation functions on the basis of prior experience. Analysis of
internal representations by the authors revealed that the devel-
oped network groups objects in hidden unit activation space by
the relations that transform them. The input/hidden-to-output
connections effectively implement a mapping whose domain is
partitioned into subdomains, one for each causal relation (e.g.,
cut, bruised, etc.). The input-to-hidden connections implement
a mapping from object pairs to points located within the subdo-
main corresponding to the relationship between the two objects,
effectively providing an index to the objects’ relation. For
example, apple and cut apple are mapped to a point in hidden
unit space contained in the subdomain for the cut transformation
function. This point provides the context for mapping the next
object, say, banana to cut banana (assuming that this transform-
ation was also learned) to complete the analogy. The same
sequence of steps may also be applied to transverse patterning,
assuming that the network has learned all the required mappings:
For example, cross and star would map to a point in the subdo-
main corresponding to the task relation T2; and star in the
context of T2 would map to bar. Unlike adults, however, the
network must be trained on all possible transformations to
make this inference.
Notice that the problem with Leech et al.’s model is not
about a complete failure to generalize. Suitably configured,
some degree of generalization may be achievable using a
learned internal similarity space of object representations. All
fruit, for example, could be represented along a common
dimension, and the various causal relations could be orthogonal
projections that systematically translate the representations of
fruit to cut fruit, or bruised fruit, and so on. Learning to com-
plete analogies for some instances of fruit and cut fruit may
generalize to the other instances, assuming the number of par-
ameters (weights) implementing the mappings is sufficiently
small compared to the number of fruit examples. But the
elements of a transverse patterning task may not be systemati-
cally related in any way other than via the transverse patterning
structure; they need not belong to the same category of objects,
and they may even contradict mappings learned from a pre-
vious task instance (e.g., cross may predict bar in a new instance
of the task). Thus, there is no basis on which the needed simi-
larity could have developed. The problem is that the capacity
for abstract analogical inference transcends specific object
relationships.
Despite this pessimistic assessment, perhaps an explanation
for analogy could be based on transformations augmented with
processes that represent and manipulate symbols. Assuming a
capacity to bind/unbind representations of objects to represen-
tations of symbols, abstract analogies such as transverse pattern-
ing may be realized as the transformation of symbols (e.g., symbol
a maps to b, b maps to c, and c maps to a), instead of specific
object representations. However, hybrid theories are to be
judged at a higher explanatory standard (Aizawa 2002). Not
only are they required to explain each component (e.g., an
object transformation account for concrete analogies and a sym-
bolization account for abstract analogies), but they also need to
explain why the components are split that way.
Indeed, Aizawa’s detailed analysis of the systematicity
problem (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988) and its proposed “solutions”
(for a review, see Phillips 2007) signpost a general developmen-
tal theory of analogy. To paraphrase, the problem is not to show
how analogy is possible under particular assumptions, but to
show how analogy is a necessary consequence of those assump-
tions. The capacity for analogy, like the property of systematicity,
is a ubiquitous product of normal cognitive development. If a
developmental connectionist explanation depends on a particu-
lar network configuration, then why does it get configured that
way? And if the answer is an appeal to error minimization,
then what preserves this configuration in the face of optimization
over numerous stimulus relations that may have nothing to do
with analogy? Answers to these sorts of questions without
relying on what Aizawa distinguishes as ad hoc assumptions
would help to shift Leech et al.’s account from one that is
simply compatible with the data to one that actually explains it.
Leech et al.’s developmental approach may yield valuable
insights into the early acquisition of a capacity for concrete ana-
logical inference. But to expect that it will lead directly to higher
cognition seems more like wishful thinking.
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Abstract: The authors’ claim that analogical reasoning is the product of
relational priming is compatible with language processing work that
emphasizes the role of low-level automatic processes in the alignment
of situation models in dialogue. However, their model ignores recent
behavioral evidence demonstrating a “lexical boost” effect on relational
priming. We discuss implications of these data.
Leech et al. present a connectionist model of analogical reason-
ing based on relation priming, rather than on explicit structure-
mapping processes. Their core idea is that priming is itself a
mechanism for producing analogy, and from it ultimately emerges
the relation that is critical for establishing the similarity between a
pair of terms in one domain and a pair of terms in a second
domain. This claim is compatible with recent work in language
processing that emphasizes the role of “low-level” priming in the
development of semantic representations. This is most apparent
in work on dialogue, in which interlocutors prime each other to
produce equivalent situation models that form the basis of
mutual understanding (Pickering & Garrod 2004). For example,
interlocutors tend to repeat each other’s choice of reference
frames or ways of interpreting complex arrays (Garrod & Anderson
1987; Schober 1993). Clearly, alignment of analogical structures
constitutes an important part of such situation models.
Critically, Pickering and Garrod’s (2004) framework suggests
that alignment takes place at many linguistic levels, and that rep-
etition at low levels such as words enhances alignment at higher
levels, such as the situation model. It follows that lexical rep-
etition should enhance relational priming, and therefore analogi-
cal reasoning. Raffray et al. (2007) directly addressed the issue of
the effects of lexical repetition (of the head or modifier) on
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relation priming of noun-noun combinations such as dog scarf.
Three expression-picture matching experiments investigated
whether relation priming occurred in the context of head rep-
etition, modifier repetition, or both, and allowed direct compari-
son of the effects of head and modifier repetition. Results showed
that participants were more likely to interpret dog scarf as a scarf
decorated with a picture of a dog (i.e., dog DESCRIBES scarf)
than as a scarf worn by a dog (i.e., dog POSSESSES scarf)
after interpreting another expression involving the description
relation rather than the possession relation; but the priming
was greater when one term was repeated (e.g., dog T-shirt or
rabbit scarf) than if neither was repeated (e.g., rabbit T-shirt).
In sum, while conceptual relations were independently primed,
the level of activation that a given relation received was enhanced
where there was repetition of lexical items between prime and
target.
We propose that such “lexical boost” effects, similar to those
found in syntactic priming studies (Pickering & Branigan 1998),
mean that priming of analogical relations should be enhanced by
any repetition of terms. In Goswami and Brown (1989), the partici-
pant infers that lemon is to cut lemon as bread is to cut bread.
Importantly, the concept of a lexical boost within analogical
reasoning only makes sense in the context of two- (or more)
place relations. That is, to get a lexical boost we would need to con-
sider analogies such as boy & ball is to boy kicks ball as man &
stone is to man kicks stone. In this case, the lexical boost predicts
that participants should find it easier to resolve analogies contain-
ing repeated terms, such as boy & ball is to boy kicks ball as man &
ball is to man kicks ball, or similarly boy & ball is to boy kicks ball
as boy & stone is to boy kicks stone. For more complex analogies,
the prediction is that any repetition of concepts will enhance
analogy. To take the authors’ example, it should be easier to
draw the analogy from World War II to World War I than to the
Gulf War, because more of the objects (e.g., Germany) are
repeated (see Table 3 of the target article, sect. 4.1.2). Whereas
the analogy between Churchill orders_attack_of Germany and
Bush orders_attack_of Iraq involves different Object 1s and
Object 2s, the analogy between Churchill orders_attack_of
Germany and Lloyd George orders_attack_of Germany involves
different Object 1s but the same Object 2. If such analogy works
like the priming effects we have discussed, then lexical repetition
should facilitate analogical reasoning.
There is also evidence for a semantic boost to syntactic priming
(Cleland & Pickering 2003), so that priming is stronger when
terms are semantically related than when they are not. For
example, participants are more likely to describe a red sheep as
The sheep that is red after hearing The goat that is red than
after hearing The door that is red. It might similarly be the case
that priming of analogical relations is enhanced by the inclusion
of semantically related terms. That is, boy & stone is to boy
kicks stone as man & pebble is to man kicks pebble might be
easier to process than an analogy that contains semantically unre-
lated terms, such as boy & stone is to boy kicks stone as man & ball
is to man kicks ball. Such effects should affect both the speed and
the likelihood of obtaining a particular analogy.
Pickering and Garrod’s (2004) model of dialogue assumes that
processes by which interlocutors align their models of the situ-
ation are largely the result of automatic priming. In particular,
repetition at one level of representation enhances repetition at
other levels. For example, Branigan et al. (2000) showed that
interlocutors are more likely to repeat each other’s grammatical
choices if they also repeat each other’s choice of verbs. More gen-
erally, we assume that if two people start to use the same words,
they start to take on board the same conceptualizations. One of
the functions of analogical reasoning is to assist in the process
by which interlocutors end up with equivalent situation models,
and therefore we predict that lexical and other repetition will
enhance this process. Therefore analogical reasoning can be
seen as part of the mechanism of alignment and will be affected
by the processes affecting priming.
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Abstract: The target article develops a computational connectionist
model for analogy-making from a developmental perspective and
evaluates this model using simple analogies. Our commentary critically
reviews the advantages and limits of this approach, in particular with
respect to its expressive power, its capability to generalize across
analogous structure and analyze systematicity in analogies.
Leech et al. present a computational (connectionist) approach to
explain analogy-making from a developmental perspective. At the
outset we would like to emphasize that this is a very compelling
and advanced approach: Tackling the problem from a develop-
mental point of view enables the authors to highlight completely
new aspects of analogy-making. This approach reflects the infan-
tile learning process, from comparisons based mainly on superficial
similarity to a controlled and advanced strategy of analogical com-
parison based on structural systematicity. So far, analogy models
have always been inspired by adult analogical reasoning. Empha-
sizing the learning process, it makes sense to approach this
problem from an infantile developmental perspective: Leech
et al.’s model is based on a neural network implementing a
Hebbian learning algorithm which is able to enhance bit by bit
the strategy for analogy-making and explicitly model the develop-
ment from superficial similarity to structural similarity. More pre-
cisely, the network can learn causal relations using a transformation
of an object (e.g., “apple”) by a causal agent (e.g., “knife”) to
achieve a representation of a transformed object (e.g., “cut
apple”). The network extends this ability step by step to different
domains and cross-mapping analogies; it can model the relational
shift from surface similarity to relational similarity; and finally, it
is trained on analogies involving multiple objects and multiple
relations. There exists no other comparable analogy model model-
ing strategic learning – current analogy models can only model
analogical learning by analogical transfer.
Another interesting capability is the creative potential of the
analogy model: A trained network can creatively construct com-
pletely new objects when a relation is applied to a new (target)
object. However, this capability must also be seen critically:
Any relation can be applied to any (suitable or unsuitable) object
and always leads to some result, which might be completely mean-
ingless and absurd.
Inspired by research on infantile development, the authors
investigate mainly analogies used in previously conducted analogy
experiments with children. These are typically proportional
analogies, that is, a-is-to-b-as-c-is-to-what analogies. All of these
analogies are based only on a single, common relation, which is
the same in source and target. We argue that such analogies are
oversimplified – the task in these examples is applying the same
relation to a new target object rather than making an analogous
transfer. The target object is in fact very similar to the source
object with respect to the applicability and the outcome of the
relation. The “analogical” mapping required to solve the analogy
is very small. We do not deny that such oversimplified analogies
are necessary to investigate the initial analogical abilities of very
young children; however, an analogy model (if it is not limited to
modeling the analogy-making capability of 1-to-5-year-old
infants, who anyway have only a very limited ability of analogy-
making) must foremost have the capability to solve analogies with
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